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Abstract
We develop a model for the industry dynamics in the electricity mar-
ket, based on mean-field games of optimal stopping. In our model, there
are two types of agents: the renewable producers and the conventional
producers. The renewable producers choose the optimal moment to build
new renewable plants, and the conventional producers choose the optimal
moment to exit the market. The agents interact through the market price,
determined by matching the aggregate supply of the two types of produc-
ers with an exogenous demand function. Using a relaxed formulation of
optimal stopping mean-field games, we prove the existence of a Nash equi-
librium and the uniqueness of the equilibrium price process. An empirical
example, inspired by the UK electricity market is presented. The exam-
ple shows that while renewable subsidies clearly lead to higher renewable
penetration, this may entail a cost to the consumer in terms of higher
peakload prices. In order to avoid rising prices, the renewable subsidies
must be combined with mechanisms ensuring that sufficient conventional
capacity remains in place to meet the energy demand during peak periods.
Key words: mean-field games, optimal stopping, renewable energy, electricity
markets.
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1 Introduction
The world electricity sector is undergoing a major transition. The large-scale
deployment of renewable energy fueled by tax rebates, subsidies, and feed-in tar-
iffs in the last 20 years has profoundly changed the market landscape: instead
of large integrated utilities, a considerable fraction of electricity is now gener-
ated by small and medium-sized renewable producers. Renewable generation
is already affecting prices in many countries, and its role is bound to increase.
According to Internatonal Energy Agency [20], to limit the global temperature
increase to 1.75◦C by 2100 (Paris Agreement range midpoint), the energy sector
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must reach carbon neutrality by 2060. This objective is achievable only through
massive deployment of renewable electricity. Such levels of renewable penetra-
tion may not be compatible with the present structure of electricity markets,
networks and incentives. In particular, the near-zero marginal cost of electric-
ity from renewable sources pushes down baseload wholesale electricity prices,
eroding the profits of the conventional producers vital for system stability. As a
result, baseload conventional producers leave the market1, and the peak demand
has to be met to a larger extent by peakload plants with much higher generation
costs. Paradoxically, the increased renewable penetration may therefore lead to
higher peak prices and increased overall electricity procurement costs [25].
The goal of this paper is to develop a game theoretical model to understand
the dynamics of electricity markets under large scale renewable penetration.
More precisely, we use the setting of mean-field games (MFG) to describe the
evolution of the future electricity markets under different incentive schemes,
to understand the effect of these policy decisions on the entry and exit of the
market players and the evolution of renewable penetration and electricity prices.
We consider a stylized model with two classes of agents: (i) The intermit-
tent (wind) producers, who generate electricity with a stochastic capacity factor
at zero marginal cost. The renewable producers aim to determine the optimal
moment to enter the market, by paying a sunk cost. (ii) The conventional
(gas) producers with a fixed capacity, but a random running cost (depending
in particular on the fuel cost and the CO2 emission cost). They aim to deter-
mine the optimal moment to exit the market. The two types of agents interact
through the market price, which is deduced from the total renewable production
and the total conventional capacity through a merit order mechanism, using an
exogeneously specified deterministic demand function.
The theory of relaxed solutions of optimal stopping MFG, developped in [9],
is used to determine the dynamic equilibrium trajectory for the baseload and
peakload prices and for the conventional and renewable installed capacity. We
prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of the equilibrium
price process. Our proofs are based on technical tools specific to this particular
problem, which are not entirely covered by [9]: in particular, the price functional
deduced from the merit order mechanism is highly irregular and requires special
treatment.
A numerical illustration, inspired by the UK electricity market is presented,
and allows to conclude that while renewable subsidies clearly lead to higher
renewable penetration, this may entail a cost to the consumer in terms of higher
peakload prices. In order to avoid rising prices, the renewable subsidies must
be combined with market or off-market mechanisms ensuring that sufficient
conventional capacity remains in place to meet the energy demand during peak
periods.
1According to Reuters, the US coal electricity generation industry has been in steep de-
cline for a decade due to competition from cheap and abundant gas and subsidized solar
and wind energy, and 39,000 MW of coal-fired generation capacity was shut since 2017, see
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-coal-decline-graphic/
u-s-coal-fired-power-plants-closing-fast-despite-trumps-pledge-of-support-for-industry-idUSKBN1ZC15A
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The paper is structured as follows. In the remaining part of the introduction
we review the relevant literautre. Section 2 presents our model of the electricity
market. The relaxed solution approach and the main theoretical results are
exposed in Section 3. The numerical computation of the MFG solution is pre-
sented in Section 4 and a concrete example is discussed in Section 5. Finally, in
Appendix, we provide the detailed proof of a technical result used in the paper.
Literature review Several papers consider the effect of increased renewable
penetration on market prices of electricity both in the long-term [11] and short-
term [22] setting. Recent papers also study the interactions between energy
and capacity markets in the presence of market power, that is, the ability of
producers to willingly influence prices in a way favorable for them, and the role
of renewables in such interactions. Schwenen [28] provides empirical evidence
of market power in the New York capacity market. Fabra [14] uses a microeco-
nomic model to study the effects of market power in the capacity market on the
performance of energy markets. Benatia [6] studies strategic bidding in New
Yorks energy market.
Many authors have analyzed possible market evolutions and alternative de-
signs to ensure system reliability and economic viability. Henriot and Glachant
[19] discuss alternative schemes for market integration of renewable generators,
Levin and Botterud [24] analyze and compare different market designs to ensure
generator revenue sufficiency and Rious et al. [27] study the market design to
encourage the development of demand response and improve system flexibil-
ity. A particularly important innovation has been the introduction of capacity
markets, surveyed in [10]. The above papers mainly analyze the structure of
existing markets and make proposals for improvement but do not use models
to simulate the evolution of future markets under alternative design proposals.
This line of research has been pursued by by some authors using computational
agent-based modeling (see e.g. [8] for an application to the capacity market).
The game theory has been applied to the modeling of entry/exit decisions
of agents in electricity markets in [29], where a system of two producers is
considered, and the price is not affected by the agents’ decisions. A considerable
literature is devoted to capacity expansion games in energy markets, see e.g.,
[1]. A related strand of literature uses computational agent-based models to
understand the dynamics of wholesale electricity markets, see [31] for a review.
These models allow for heterogeneous agents and a precise description of the
market structure, but are computationally very intensive and do not provide
any insight about the model (uniqueness of the equilibrium, robustness etc.)
beyond what can be recovered from a simulated trajectory.
The machinery of MFG appears to be a promising compromise between the
complexity of computational agent-based models and the tractability of fully
analytic approaches. MFG, introduced in [23] are stochastic games with a large
number of identical agents and symmetric interactions where each agent inter-
acts with the average density of the other agents (the mean field) rather than
with each individual agent. This simplifies the problem, leading to explicit so-
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lutions or efficient numerical methods for computing the equilibrium dynamics.
In the recent years MFG have been successfully used to model specific sectors of
electricity markets, such as price formation [17], electric vehicles [12], demand
dispatch [4] and storage [2]. An important recent development is the introduc-
tion of MFG of optimal stopping / obstacle mean-field games [7, 9, 15], which
can describe technology switches and entry/exit decisions of players. In this
paper, we follow the relaxed solution approach of [9] (see also [16] for a related
notion of relaxed solution), and extend the theoretical results of that paper to
allow for two classes of agents and enable the agents to interact through the
market price, which is an irregular functional not covered by the assumptions
in [9].
2 The model
We fix a terminal time horizon T and consider a model of electricity market
with exogeneous demand and producing agents of two different types. In this
section, we describe the model for a finite number of agents, before passing to
the MFG limit in the following ones.
Conventional producers The maximum capacity of all conventional pro-
ducers is assumed to be identical and fixed; the plants can operate at zero, full
or partial capacity. Each conventional producer has a marginal cost function
Cit : [0, 1] 7→ R,
in other words, if the plant is operating at a fraction ξ of its total capacity, Cit(ξ)
corresponds to the unit cost of producing an additional infinitesimal amount of
energy. We assume that
Cit(ξ) = C
i
t + c(ξ),
where Cit is the baseline cost process and c : R+ 7→ [0, 1] is a deterministic
strictly increasing smooth function with c(0) = 0. This increasing property is
justified by the need to start up additional less efficient units, recall additional
employees etc. Consequently, for a given price level p, the producer offers a
fraction F (p − Cit) of its total capacity, where F is the inverse mapping of c.
F is also a smooth increasing function, and it satisfies F (y) = 0 for y ≤ 0,
F (y) > 0 for y > 0 and F (y) = 1 for y ≥ c(1). In other words, the producer
does not offer any capacity if the price is less than the production cost, and as
the price increases beyond the production cost, the producer gradually offers
more capacity, until reaching the full capacity at a sufficiently high price level.
The baseline cost is assumed to follow the CIR process:
dCit = k(θ − Cit)dt+ δ
√
CitdW
i
t , C
i
0 = ci, (1)
where (W i)i≥1 are independent standard Brownian motions, θ is the long-term
average cost, k is the rate of mean reversion and δ determines the variability
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of the cost process. The conventional producers aim to exit the market at the
optimal time τi. We denote by ω
n
t (dx) the distribution of costs of conventional
producers who have not yet exited the market (when there are a total of n
producers in the beginning of the game). In other words,
ωnt (dx) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δCit (dx)1τi>t.
Note that we have normalized the distribution by the number of producers,
which turns out to be convenient at a later stage. This is equivalent to assuming
that the capacity of each producer equals 1n .
Renewable producers Renewable producers aim to enter the market at the
optimal time σi. To enter the market (build the power plant) they pay the cost
KR after which the plant generates S
i
t ∈ (0, 1) units of electricity per unit time
at zero cost, where the intermittent output Si follows the Jacobi process
dSit = k¯(θ¯ − Sit)dt+ δ¯
√
Sit(1− Sit)dW
i
t, S
i
0 = si ∈ (0, 1), (2)
where (W i)i≥1 are standard Brownian motions, independent from each other
and from the price processes of conventional producers. With this model we are
not attempting to describe the high-frequency variation of the power output due
to the intermittency of the renewable resource, but rather the slow variation of
the capacity factor due to climate variability and other effects.
We assume that there are n potential renewable projects in the beginning
of the game, which may enter the market at some time. We denote by ηnt (dx)
the (potential) distribution of output of renewable producers who have not yet
entered the market :
ηt(dx) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δSit (dx)1σi>t.
We shall also need the distribution of output values of all renewable projects:
η¯nt (dx) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δSit (dx).
Note that both distributions are also normalized by the number of agents. The
normalization allows to simplify some expressions but our model can easily be
extended to the case when the number of conventional producers is different
from that of the renewable projects, or when the capacities of these two types
of agents are different.
We denote by L the infinitesimal generator of the process Ci and by L that
of Si. These are given by
Lf = k(θ − x)∂f
∂x
+
δ2x
2
∂2f
∂x2
,
Lf = k¯(θ¯ − x)∂f
∂x
+
δ¯2x(1− x)
2
∂2f
∂x2
.
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The state spaces are denoted by Ω and Ω, respectively.
Gain function of conventional producers At time t and price level p, each
conventional producer solves the profit maximisation problem
max
ξ
pξ −
∫ ξ
0
Cit(ξ)dξ.
The optimal fraction is ξ∗ := c−1(p − Cit) if p ≥ Cit . Thus, the profit of the
producer is
pξ∗ −
∫ ξ∗
0
Cit(ξ)dξ = (p− Cit)F (p− Cit)−
∫ F (p−Cit)
0
c(ξ)dξ := G(p− Cit),
where
G(x) = xF (x)−
∫ F (x)
0
c(ξ)dξ =
∫ F (x)
0
(x− c(ξ))dξ =
∫ x
0
F (z)dz,
where the second equality results from a change of variable using the fact that
F is the inverse of c.
The problem of the individual conventional producer is then
max
τ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ τ
0
e−ρt(G(Pnt − Cit)− κC)dt+KCe−(γC+ρ)τ
]
,
where T ([0, T ]) represents the set of stopping times with respect to the filtration
generated by (W it )i≥1,(W¯
i)i≥1, with values between 0 and T . Here Pnt is the
market price of electricity, determined from the strategies of all agents via the
merit order mechanism described below in this section, κC is the fixed cost per
unit of time that the producer pays until exiting the market and e−γCtKC is
the value recovered if the plant is sold at time t, where γC is the depreciation
rate of the conventional plant. To avoid a discontinuity at the terminal date
T , we assume that the plant is sold at date T in any case. This maximization
problem may equivalently be written as
max
τ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρt1t<τ
{
G(Pnt − Cit)− κC − e−γCtKC(ρ+ γC)
}
dt
]
,
or, with a more compact notation,
max
τ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρt1t<τ
{
G(Pnt − Cit) + fC(t)
}
dt
]
,
fC(t) = −κC − e−γCtKC(ρ+ γC).
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Gain function of renewable producers The renewable producers always
bid their full (but intermittent) capacity. We assume that the prices are always
positive, and neglect the forecasting error of the producers. The problem of the
individual agent is then
max
σ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ T
σ
e−ρt(Pnt S
i
t − κR)dt−KRe−ρσ +KRe−ρT−γR(T−σ)
]
,
where σ is the time of entering the market, κR is the fixed cost of owning the
plant, KR is the fixed cost of building the plant and K
−γR(T−σ)
R is the value of
the plant at time T , where γR is the depreciation rate of the renewable plant.
Once again, to minimize the boundary effect, we assume that the agent recovers
the value of the plant reduced by the depreciation rate at the terminal date T .
This maximization problem may equivalently be written as
max
σ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ T
0
1t<σe
−ρt
{
−Pnt Sit + κR + ρKR + γRKRe−(ρ+γR)(T−t)
}]
,
or, with a more compact notation,
max
σ∈T ([0,T ])
E
[∫ T
0
1t<σe
−ρt {−Pnt Sit + fR(t)}
]
,
fR(t) = κR + ρKR + γRKRe
−(ρ+γR)(T−t).
Baseline supply We assume that in addition to the renewable and conven-
tional producers considered above there is a baseline supply by conventional
producers, which will never leave the market (e.g., state-owned producers, which
ensure the network security) and do not take part in the game. This baseline
supply at price level p is denoted by F0(p) where the function F0 is increasing
and satisfies F0(0) = 0, F0(p+ h)− F (p) ≥ ch for some c > 0 and all p, h ≥ 0.
This last assumption is imposed for techical reasons and ensures the continuity
of the equilibrium price process.
The total supply by the conventional producers at price level p, including
the baseline supply, is therefore given by∫
Ω
F (p− x)ωnt (dx) + F0(p).
The total renewable supply at time t, on the other hand, is given by
Rnt =
∫
Ω
x(η¯nt (dx)− ηnt (dx)).
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Price formation In our model, the different agents are coupled through the
market price, determined by matching the exogeneous demand process Dt, to
the aggregate supply function of market participants, in a stylized version of the
day-ahead electricity market. In other words, since the residual demand after
subtracting the renewable supply which is always present in the market, must
be met by conventional producers, the electricity price Pnt is defined as follows.
Pnt = inf{P : (Dt −Rnt )+ ≤
∫
Ω
F (P − x)ωnt (dx) + F0(P )} ∧ P ,
where P is the price cap in the market and we use the convention inf ∅ = +∞.
When the price cap P is reached, the demand may not be entirely satisfied by
the producers.
Our aim here is not to model the daily price fluctuations but rather the slow
evolution of the average market price due to changes of structure of electric-
ity supply. However, to make the illustration more realistic, in section 5 we
shall consider separately the peak price (Mon-Fri, 7AM-8PM) and the off-peak
price. This extension presents no technical difficulties, and therefore, to simplify
notation, we consider a single price in the rest of the paper.
3 Relaxed MFG formulation of the problem
To simplify the resolution and the study of price equilibria, we place ourselves
from now on in the MFG framework, where the number of agents (both conven-
tional and renewable) is assumed to be infinite. As in many papers on mean-field
games, we do not study the convergence of the n-player game to the MFG but
analyze the MFG framework directly. We denote the limiting versions of the
distributions ωnt , η
n
t and η¯
n
t by ωt, ηt and η¯t, respectively, and the limiting
market price and renewable demand by Pt and Rt. Since in our game the id-
iosyncratic noises of agents are independent and there is no common noise, these
limiting measures and processes are assumed to be deterministic. Note that ωt
and ηt are not probability distributions: the total mass of both these measures
is decreasing with t. We finally assume that the demand Dt is deterministic.
We follow the relaxed optimal stopping MFG approach, introduced in [9],
adapting it to the present setting of electricity markets. To this end, we first
recall the topology on flows of measures used in this reference. Let VΩ be the
space of flows of signed bounded measures on Ω, (mt(·))0≤t≤T such that: for
every t ∈ [0, T ], mt is a signed bounded measure on Ω, for every A ∈ B(Ω),
the mapping t 7→ mt(A) is measurable, and
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
mt(dx) dt <∞. To each flow
m ∈ VΩ, we associate a signed measure on [0, T ] × Ω defined by µ(dt, dx) :=
mt(dx) dt, and we endow VΩ with the topology of weak convergence of the
associated measures. VΩ is defined in the same way.
Given a deterministic measurable price process (Pt)t≥0, the relaxed solu-
tion approach consists in replacing the optimal stopping problem of individual
8
conventional producer,
sup
τ
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρt[G(Pt − Ct) + fC(t)]1t<τdt
]
, (3)
by its relaxed version
sup
ω∈A(ω0)
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt − x) + fC(t)]ωt(dx) dt, (4)
where the set A(ω0) contains all flows of positive bounded measures (ωˆt)0≤t≤T ∈
VΩ satisfying ∫
Ω
u(0, x)ω0(dx) +
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
{
∂u
∂t
+ Lu
}
ωˆt(dx) dt ≥ 0
for all u ≥ 0, u ∈ C1,2([0, T ]× Ω) such that ∂u∂t + Lu is bounded.
In the relaxed formulation of the optimal stopping problem, instead of look-
ing for an optimal stopping time, one looks for the optimal measure flow, corre-
sponding, at each time t, to the distribution of agents in a population which have
not yet exited the game. The precise relationship between the optimal stopping
problem (3) and its relaxed version (4) is described in [9]. In particular, under
appropriate assumptions, it holds that
sup
ω∈A(ω0)
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt − x) + fC(t)]ωt(dx) dt =
∫
Ω
v(0, x)ω0(dx),
where v(0, x) is the value function of the optimal stopping problem (3) at time
t = 0:
v(0, x) = sup
τ
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρt[G(Pt − C(0,x)t ) + fC(t)]1t<τdt
]
Similarly, the optimal stopping problem of individual renewable producer
sup
σ
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρt {−PtSt + fR(t)}1t<σdt
]
is replaced by its relaxed version
sup
η∈A(η0)
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt {−Ptx+ fR(t)} ηt(dx) dt, (5)
where the set A(η0) ⊂ VΩ is defined similarly to A(ω0).
Given the flows (ωt)0≤t≤T and (ηt)0≤t≤T , the price process (Pt)0≤t≤T is
defined as follows.
Pt = inf{P : (Dt −Rt)+ ≤
∫
Ω
F (Pt − x)ωt(dx) + F0(Pt)} ∧ P , 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
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where Rt =
∫
Ω
x(η¯t(dx)− ηt(dx)). We denote the price, defined in this way, by
Pt(ωt, ηt).
We now introduce the definition of a relaxed Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1. The Nash equilibrium of the relaxed mean-field game is the
couple (ω∗t , η
∗
t ) such that for any other measure ω ∈ A(ω0),∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ω∗t , η
∗
t )− x) + fC(t)]ωt(dx) dt
≤
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ω∗t , η
∗
t )− x) + fC(t)]ω∗t (dx) dt,
and for any other measure η ∈ A(η0)∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[−Pt(ω∗t , η∗t )x+ fR(t)]ηt(dx) dt
≤
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[−Pt(ω∗t , η∗t )x+ fR(t)]η∗t (dx) dt.
In the rest of this section we study the solutions of the relaxed MFG problem.
Firsly, the following lemma establishes the existence of solution for the individual
relaxed optimal stopping problems.
Lemma 1. Let the price process (Pt)0≤t≤T be fixed, and asume that it has
bounded variation on [0, T ].
i. Let ω0 satisfy ∫
Ω
ln{1 + |x|}ω0(dx) <∞.
Then there exists ω∗ ∈ A(ω0) which solves the problem (4).
ii. Let η0 satisfy ∫
Ω
ln{1 + |x|}η0(dx) <∞.
Then there exists η∗ ∈ A(η0) which solves the problem (5).
Proof. Part i. Choose a maximizing sequence of flows of measures (ωnt )
n≥1
t∈[0,T ] ⊂
A(ω0). By Lemma 3.8 in [9], the set A(ω0) is sequentially compact2, therefore
this sequence has a subsequence, also denoted by (ωn), which converges to a limit
ω∗ ∈ A(m∗0). It remains to show that ω∗ is a maximizer of (4). Let (Pmt )m≥1
2Our processes do not satisfy Assumption (X-SDE) of [9], but Lemma 3.8 only needs linear
growth of coefficients
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be a sequence of uniformly bounded continuous mappings approximating Pt in
L1([0, T ]). Note that G is a Lipschitz function, with Lipschitz constant 1. Then,∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
[G(Pt − x) + fC(t)]ωnt (dx) =
∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
[G(Pmt − x) + fC(t)]ωnt (dx)
+
∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
[G(Pt − x)−G(Pmt − x)]ωnt (dx).
(6)
The second term satisfies∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
[G(Pt − x)−G(Pmt − x)]ωnt (dx)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫ T
0
|Pt − Pmt |
∫
Ω
ωnt (dx) (7)
Taking the test function
u(t, x) =
∫ T
t
f(s)ds
with f ≥ 0 continuous in the definition of A(ω0), we have:∫
Ω
ω0(dx)
∫ T
0
f(s)ds ≥
∫ T
0
f(s)ds
∫
Ω
ωnt (dx).
This implies that for every n, t-almost everywhere,∫
Ω
ωnt (dx) ≤
∫
Ω
ω0(dx),
and so (7) converges to zero as m → ∞, uniformly on n. On the other hand,
by weak convergence, the first term in (6) converges to∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
[G(Pmt − x) + fC(t)]ω∗t (dx),
which, once again, converges to∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
[G(Pt − x) + fC(t)]ω∗t (dx)
as m→∞. Combining the three limits and using the fact that the convergence
of (7) is uniform on n, the proof is completed.
Part ii. This part is shown similarly to the first part.
In the mean-field game context, the price becomes a function of ηt and ωt.
The following technical lemma establishes the properties of the price process.
Its proof is presented in the appendix.
Lemma 2.
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i. Let ω ∈ A(ω0) and η ∈ A(η0) and assume that the demand D has bounded
variation on [0, T ]. Then the price process Pt(ωt, ηt) has bounded variation
on [0, T ] as well.
ii. Let (ωnt ) and (η
n
t ) be sequences of elements of A(ω0) and A(η0), converg-
ing, respectively, to ω∗ ∈ A(ω0) and η∗ ∈ A(η0). Assume that the de-
mand D has bounded variation on [0, T ]. Then there exists a subsequence
(nk)k≥0 such that Pt(ωnkt , η
nk
t ) converges to Pt(ω
∗
t , η
∗
t ) in L
1([0, T ]).
We now prove the existence of a relaxed Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium for the relaxed MFG problem.
Proof. Following the ideas of Theorem 4.4 in [9], we define the set valued map-
ping
Θ : (ω, η) 7→ arg max
ωˆ∈A(ω0)
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ωt, ηt)− x) + fC(t)]ωˆt(dx) dt
× arg max
ηˆ∈A(η0)
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[−Pt(ωt, ηt)x+ fR(t)]ηˆt(dx) dt.
To establish existence of Nash equilibrium by applying Fan-Glicksberg fixed
point theorem, it is enough to show that Θ has closed graph, which is defined
by
Gr(Θ) = {(ω, ω¯, η, η¯) ∈ A(ω0)2 ×A(η0)2 : (ω, η) ∈ Θ(ω¯, η¯)}
To prove that Gr(Θ) is closed it is in turn sufficient to show that for any two
sequences (ωn, ω¯n)n≥1 ∈ A(ω0)2, (ηn, η¯n)n≥1 ∈ A¯(η0)2, which converge weakly
to (ω, ω¯) ∈ (A(ω0))2 (resp.(η, η¯) ∈ (A¯(η0))2 ) and such that∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ωnt , η
n
t )− x) + fC(t)]ω¯nt (dx)
≥
∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ωnt , η
n
t )− x) + fC(t)]ωˆt(dx), for all ωˆ ∈ A(ω0)
and∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[−Pt(ωnt , ηnt )x+ fR(t)]η¯nt (dx) dt
≥
∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[−Pt(ωnt , ηnt )x+ fR(t)]ηˆt(dx), for all ηˆ ∈ A¯(η0),
we have∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ωt, ηt)− x) + fC(t)]ω¯t(dx)
≥
∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[(G(Pt(ωt, ηt)− x) + fC(t)]ωˆt(dx), for all ωˆ ∈ A(ω0)
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and∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[−Pt(ωt, ηt)x+ fR(t)]η¯t(dx) dt
≥
∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[−Pt(ωt, ηt)x+ fR(t)]ηˆt(dx), for all ηˆ ∈ A¯(η0).
To prove this, it is enough to show, that up to taking a subsequence,
lim
n
∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ωnt , η
n
t )− x) + fC(t)]ω¯nt (dx)
=
∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ωt, ηt)− x) + fC(t)]ω¯t(dx) (8)
lim
n
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[−Pt(ωnt , ηnt )x+ fR(t)]η¯nt (dx) dt
=
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt[−Pt(ωt, ηt)x+ fR(t)]η¯t(dx) dt. (9)
We first focus on (9), which can be rewritten as follows.
lim
n
∫ T
0
e−ρtdt
{
−Pt(ωnt , ηnt )
∫
Ω
xη¯nt (dx) + fR(t)
∫
Ω
η¯nt (dx)
}
=
∫ T
0
e−ρtdt
{
−Pt(ωt, ηt)
∫
Ω
xη¯t(dx) + fR(t)
∫
Ω
η¯t(dx)
}
.
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 2 (step 1), one can prove
that the total variation of the map t 7→ ∫
Ω
xη¯nt (dx) on [0, T ] is uniformly
bounded with respect to n. This implies that one can find a subsequence of
this sequence of maps, converging in L1([0, T ]) to some limit, which can be
identified, due to weak convergence of the sequence η¯n, with
∫
Ω
xη¯t(dx). Fur-
thermore, by Lemma 2, part ii., P·(ωn· , η
n
· ) converges in L
1([0, T ]) to P·(ω·, η·)
(up to taking a subsequence). Since both factors are bounded, the integral of
their product also converges, and the convergence of the last term in (9) follows
from weak convergence of the measures.
Let us now turn to (8). Recall that G is Lipschitz with constant 1. Then,∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ωnt , η
n
t )− x) + fC(t)]ω¯nt (dx)
−
∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ωt, ηt)− x) + fC(t)]ω¯t(dx)
∣∣∣
≤
∫ T
0
dte−ρt|(Pt(ωnt , ηnt )− Pt(ωt, ηt)|
∫
Ω
ω¯nt (dx)
+
∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ωt, ηt)− x) + fC(t)](ω¯nt − ω¯t(dx))
∣∣∣.
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As before, we can show that, up to taking a subsequence∫
Ω
ω¯n· (dx)
L1([0,T ])−−−−−−→
∫
Ω
ω¯·(dx), (10)
and thus the first term above converges to 0 since Pt is bounded. For the second
term, we consider a sequence of bounded continuous functions Pmt , approximat-
ing the price Pt(ωt, ηt) in L
1([0, T ]). Using once again the Lipschitz property of
G and the fact that this function is increasing,∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pt(ωt, ηt)− x) + fC(t)](ω¯nt − ω¯t(dx))
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
dt
∫
Ω
e−ρt[G(Pmt − x) + fC(t)](ω¯nt − ω¯t(dx))
∣∣∣
+
∫ T
0
dt e−ρt|(Pt(ωt, ηt)− Pmt |
∣∣∣∣∫
Ω
(ω¯nt − ω¯t(dx))
∣∣∣∣ .
The first term above converges to zero in view of the weak convergence of
measures, and for the second term we can once again use (10) and dominated
convergence.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium price process We will show that different
Nash equilibria necessarily correspond to the same price, except possibly on a
set of measure zero.
Proposition 2. Let (ω1, η1) and (ω2, η2) be two Nash equilibria. Then, the set
of points t such that Pt(ω
1
t , η
1
t ) 6= Pt(ω2t , η2t ) has Lebesgue measure zero.
Proof. Let
f(t, ω, η, x) = G(Pt(ω, η)− x) + fC(t) and f¯(t, ω, η, x) = −Pt(ω, η)x+ fR(t).
By definition of the Nash equilibrium,∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt(f(t, ω1t , η
1
t , x)− f(t, ω2t , η2t , x))(ω1t (dx)− ω2t (dx))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt(f¯(t, ω1t , η
1
t , x)− f¯(t, ω2t , η2t , x))(η1t (dx)− η2t (dx))dt ≥ 0.
Choose t such that Pt(ω
1
t , η
1
t ) > Pt(ω
2
t , η
2
t ) From the fact that F is increasing
and the mean value theorem, we deduce the following simple estimate:
(P1 − P2)F (P2 − x) ≤ G(P1 − x)−G(P2 − x) ≤ (P1 − P2)F (P1 − x), P1 ≥ P2.
Moreover, the definition of the price implies that∫
Ω
F (Pt(ω
1
t , η
1
t )− x)ω1t (dx) ≤ (Dt −R1t )+ − F0(Pt(ω1t , η1t ))∫
Ω
F (Pt(ω
2
t , η
2
t )− x)ω2t (dx) = (Dt −R2t )+ − F0(Pt(ω2t , η2t ))
Dt −R1t > 0,
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where
Rit =
∫
Ω
x(η¯t(x)− ηit(x))dx.
Therefore,∫
Ω
(G(Pt(ω
1
t , η
1
t )− x)−G(Pt(ω2t , η2t )− x))(ω1t (dx)− ω2t (dx))
≤ (Pt(ω1t , η1t )− Pt(ω2t , η2t ))
×
{∫
Ω
F (Pt(ω
1
t , η
1
t )− x)ω1t (dx)−
∫
Ω
F (Pt(ω
2
t , η
2
t )− x)ω2t (dx)
}
≤ (Pt(ω1t , η1t )− Pt(ω2t , η2t ))
× {(Dt −R1t )+ − F0(Pt(ω1t , η1t ))− (Dt −R2t )+ + F0(Pt(ω2t , η2t ))}
and we obtain the antimonotonicity property∫
Ω
(f(t, ω1t , η
1
t , x)− f(t, ω2t , η2t , x))(ω1t (dx)− ω2t (dx))
+
∫
Ω
(f¯(t, ω1t , η
1
t , x)− f¯(t, ω2t , η2t , x))(η1t (dx)− η2t (dx))
≤
∫
Ω
((Pt(ω
1
t , η
1
t )− x)F (Pt(ω1t , η1t )− x)− (Pt(ω2t , η2t )− x)F (Pt(ω2t , η2t )− x))
× (ω1t (dx)− ω2t (dx)) + (Pt(ω2t , η2t )− Pt(ω1t , η1t ))(R1t −R2t )
≤ {(Dt −R1t )+ +R1t − F0(Pt(ω1t , η1t ))− (Dt −R2t )+ −R2t + F0(Pt(ω2t , η2t ))}
× (Pt(ω1t , η1t )− Pt(ω2t , η2t ))
= (Pt(ω
1
t , η
1
t )− Pt(ω2t , η2t ))
{−F0(Pt(ω1t , η1t ))− (Dt −R2t )− + F0(Pt(ω2t , η2t ))}
≤ −c(Pt(ω1t , η1t )− Pt(ω2t , η2t ))2
The case where Pt(ω
1
t , η
1
t ) < Pt(ω
2
t , η
2
t ) is dealt with by a symmetric argument.
Finally, when Pt(ω
1
t , η
1
t ) = Pt(ω
2
t , η
2
t ), the left-hand side of the above equality
is clearly zero. Thus,∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt(f(t, ω1t , η
1
t , x)− f(t, ω2t , η2t , x))(ω1t (dx)− ω2t (dx))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt(f¯(t, ω1t , η
1
t , x)− f¯(t, ω2t , η2t , x))(η1t (dx)− η2t (dx))dt
≤ −c
∫ T
0
e−ρt(Pt(ω1t , η
1
t )− Pt(ω2t , η2t ))2dt,
which is in contradiction with the Nash equilibrium property unless Pt(ω
1
t , η
1
t ) =
Pt(ω
2
t , η
2
t ) almost everywhere on [0, T ].
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4 Numerical computation of the equilibrium mea-
sures
Computing the MFG equilibrium In the numerical algorithm, we succes-
sively take a step of descreasing size towards the best response, until a desired
convergence criterion is met. Recall that the Nash equilibrium of the relaxed
mean-field game is described in Definition 1. The computation of ω∗ and η∗ is
achieved using the following procedure.
• Choose initial values ω(0) ∈ A(ω0) and η(0) ∈ A(η0)
• For i = 1 . . . Niter
– Compute the best responses
ω˜(i) = arg max
ω∈A(ω0)
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt
[
G(Pt(ω
(i−1), η(i−1))− x) + fC(t)
]
ωt(dx) dt,
η˜(i) = arg max
η∈A(η0)
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt
[
−Pt(ω(i−1), η(i−1))x+ fR(t)
]
ηt(dx) dt.
– Choose the step size parameter: w(i) = 1i .
– Update the measures:
ω(i) = (1− w(i))ω(i−1) + w(i)ω˜(i),
η(i) = (1− w(i))η(i−1) + w(i)η˜(i).
The number of steps of the algorithm may be fixed or chosen based on a conver-
gence criterion. In our implementation, we monitor the relative improvement of
the best response, defined by
EC(ω(n), η(n)) = max
ω∈A(ω0)
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt
[
G(Pt(ω
(n), η(n))− x) + fC(t)
]
(ωt − ω(n)t )(dx) dt,
ER(ω(n), η(n)) = max
η∈A(η0)
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
e−ρt
[
−Pt(ω(n), η(n))x+ fR(t)
]
(ηt − η(n)t )(dx) dt.
Clearly, EC(ω, η) ≥ 0 and ER(ω, η) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ A(ω0) and η ∈ A(η0), and the
situation when EC(ω, η) = ER(ω, η) = 0 corresponds to the Nash equilibrium.
In general, EC(ω, η) corresponds to the increase of gain of all conventional pro-
ducers if they move from the current value ω, to their best response, supposing
that the distribution of renewable producers remains unchanged, and similarly
for the renewable producers.
We do not prove the convergence of the algorithm, however, in the illus-
trations presented in the next section we observe convergence of EC(ω(n), η(n))
and ER(ω(n), η(n)) to zero at the rate 1n , thus the algorithm produces an ε-Nash
equilibrium in O(ε−1) steps.
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Computing the best response To compute the best response numerically,
we discretize the Fokker-Planck inequalities in the definition of the sets A and
A, in time and in space. The process S (renewable output) is discretized on
the interval (Smin, Smax) with Smin = 0 and Smax = 1, using a uniform grid
with Ns + 1 points. The process C (conventional cost) is similarly discretized
on the interval (Cmin, Cmax) with Cmin = 0 and Cmax chosen depending on the
model parameters, using a uniform grid with NC + 1 points. Finally, the time
interval is also discretized using a uniform grid with NT + 1 points. We define
∆S = Smax−SminNS , Sj = Smin + j∆S for j = 0, . . . , NS , and similarly for the
other variables. Every measure ω ∈ A(ω0) satisfies, in the sense of distributions,
the Fokker-Planck inequality
−∂ωt
∂t
− k ∂
∂x
((θ − x)ωt) + δ
2
2
∂2
∂x2
(xωt) ≥ 0.
This inequality is discretized using the implicit scheme, leading to the following
system of inequailties:
ωji ≥
(
1 +
2σ2j∆t
∆C2
)
ωji+1 −∆t
(
σ2j+1
∆C2
− µj+1
2∆C
)
ωj+1i+1 −∆t
(
σ2j−1
∆C2
+
µj−1
2∆C
)
ωj−1i+1
for 0 ≤ j ≤ NC and i = 0, . . . , NT−1, where for j = 0 and J = NC , these
formulas are interpreted by assuming that ω−1i = ω
NC
i = 0 for i = 0, . . . , NT .
In the above formula, ωji denotes the discretized density at the point (Ti, Cj),
µj = k(θ − Cj) and σ2j = δ
2Cj
2 . The inequalities for η are discretized similarly.
The gain functional is similarly approximated by the discrete sum: for example,
for the conventional producers we have,
NT∑
i=0
NC∑
j=0
e−ρTi [G(PTi(ωi, ηi)− Cj) + fC(Ti)]ωji .
The best response is then computed by maximizing this functional under the in-
equality constraints given above and the positivity constraints, using an interior
point method for linear programming.
5 Illustration
The goal of this section is to provide a toy example inspired by the British
electricity sector to illustrate our model, rather than use it to obtain realistic
projections, which will be the topic of future research. Table 1 shows the UK
installed generation capacity in 2017. The main energy sources are gas, nuclear
and intermittent renewables, which is 80% wind. We therefore consider an econ-
omy consisting of only these three sources of electricity. Our model takes into
account the departures of conventional producers and entry of new renewable
projects into the market. The nuclear energy and the pumped storage gen-
eration is accounted for as baseline supply. The maximum baseline supply is
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Conventional steam CCGT Nuclear Pumped storage Wind & Solar
18.0 32.9 9.4 2.7 40.6
Table 1: UK Electricity installed generation capacity in 2017, GW. Conventional
steam includes coal and gas. CCGT stands for combined cycle gas turbine.
Wind and solar is approximately 20% solar and 80% wind, out of which there
is about 60% onshore and 40% offshore. Source: UK Energy in Brief 2018
therefore taken to be equal to 12.1 GW. We make an ad hoc assumption that the
baseline supply increases linearly as function of price, from zero at zero price,
to 12.1 at the maximal price value.
The total installed gas capacity is taken to be equal to 35.9 GW. The total
installed renewable capacity is taken to be equal to 35.6 GW. To estimate the
potential additional renewable generation capacity, we use the UK government
projections3. Under the high fossil fuel price scenario, the additional renewable
generation capacity by 2035 is estimated at 55 GW, and under the reference
scenario at 42 GW. We use the value 47 GW in the examples below.
Capital costs, discount rate and depreciation rate for renewable pro-
ducers. The report [30] summarizes 17 studies of capital costs of onshore wind
power plants. Taking the average of these 17 values, we obtain a mean capital
cost of 1377 GBP per kilowatt of energy (in 2011 GBP) and a mean discount
rate of 8.6%. The annual operational and maintenance cost are estimated in
this report to be between 1% and 1.5% of the capital costs, and we use the
value of 1.25% in the simulation. Finally, the lifetime of the wind power plants
is taken to be equal to 20 years, and we take γR =
log 2
10 meaning that the plant
looses 50% of its value over 10 years.
Capital costs and depreciation rate for conventional producers We
assume that the fixed running cost of the conventional power plants is kC = 30
GBP per MW of capacity per year (see [21]). Upon exiting the market, the
conventional producer is assumed to lose the value of the plant in its entirety
(KC = 0).
Initial distribution and dynamics of the capacity factors To find a
plausible initial distribution of renewable capacity factors, we computed the
capacity factors of 20 largest UK onshore wind plants for the year 2018. The
list of power plant locations was downloaded at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of onshore wind farms in the United Kingdom, and
the capacity factors were computed using the software at
https://www.renewables.ninja/, which uses MERRA-2 reanalysis dataset.
The mean of the 20 values is 42.61% and the standard deviation is 4.43%. We
3
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/updated-energy-and-emissions-projections-2018
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therefore calibrate the mean and variance of the stationary distribution of the
capacity factor process to these values.
The stationary distribution of the Jacobi process (see e.g. [18]), also known
as Wright-Fisher diffusion (2) (see [13, Chapter 10]) is the two-parameter beta
distribution given by
p(x) =
x
2k¯θ¯
δ¯2
−1(1− x) 2k¯(1−θ¯)δ¯2 −1
B
(
2k¯θ¯
δ¯2
, 2k¯(1−θ¯)
δ¯2
) ,
where B is the beta function. The mean and variance of this invariant distribu-
tion are θ¯ and θ¯(1−θ¯)δ¯
2
2k¯+δ¯2
, respectively. To calibrate the parameters (k¯, θ¯, δ¯), we
need a third constraint, which cannot be obtained from the stationary distribu-
tion. To this end, we fixed the parameter k¯ in an ad hoc manner to k¯ = 0.5.
Initial distribution and dynamics of the cost processes of gas-fired
power plants It is difficult to quantify the full runinng cost of a gas-fired
power plant. To have an idea of the distribution of such costs, we study the
aggregate offer curves from the spot electricity market. For reasons of data
availability, we use the curves from the French electricity markets, assuming
that the costs are roughly the same in France and in the UK, after accounting
for exchange rate. The typical aggregate offer curve in the French spot market,
truncated to the price interval from -50 EUR to 100 EUR, is shown in Figure
1, left graph. We see that this curve can be split into different almost linear
segments, corresponding to different fuel types. We fit the aggregate offer curve
using a piecewise-constant function with four breakpoints (shown as a thick
solid line in Figure 1, left graph) and identify the longest linear segment as
corresponding to offers by gas-fired power plants. This is motivated by the fact
that gas has the largest share of flexible generation (excluding nuclear) in France.
This gives a distribution of bids for a specific hour, which is then averaged over
24 hours to obtain the daily distribution. This analysis is performed on each
day for the period from January 1st, 2016 to October 5th, 2017. This gives us
a cost distribution for each day of this reference period. Figure 1, right graph,
shows the evolution of the mean and standard deviation of this distribution,
together with the evolution of the fuel price (spot gas price for trading region
France), converted to electricity price using an efficiency factor of 44%. The
average values of the mean and standard deviation are, respectively, 33.4 and
11.0 (after conversion to GBP). We therefore calibrate the mean and standard
deviation of the stationary distribution of the cost factor process to these values.
The stationary distribution of the CIR process (1) (see e.g. [5]) is the two-
parameter gamma distribution.
p(x) =
(
δ2
2k
)− 2kθ
δ2
Γ
(
2kθ
δ2
) x 2kδ2 θ−1e− 2kδ2 x
The mean and variance of this invariant distribution are θ and θδ
2
2k , respectively.
As before, to calibrate the parameters (k, θ, δ), we need a third constraint, which
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Figure 1: Left: typical offer curve in the French electricity market. Right:
evolution of the daily mean and standard deviation of the offers by gas-fired
power plants in the French electricity market.
cannot be obtained from the stationary distribution and we fixed the parameter
k in an ad hoc manner to k = 0.5.
Bidding function of gas-fired power plants Since it is difficult to recon-
struct the actual bidding function used by market participants, we use an ad hoc
bidding function, satisfying our assumptions, which takes the following form:
F (x) = 1x> +
1
2
(1 + sin(−pi/2 + pix/))10≤x≤,
where  is a parameter which we choose equal to 0.5. This means that the
conventional generators bid their full capacity as soon as the price is greater
than the cost plus 0.5 GBP. The actual choice of  does not have a significant
effect on the results.
Electricity demand projections. The reference electricity consumption evo-
lution scenario is taken from the British government projections4. This refer-
ence provides a forecast of average annual electricity consumption up to 2035. In
our model, the time step was fixed to 3 months and a distinction between peak
(7AM-8PM, Mon-Fri) and off-peak demand has been made. To this end, we have
used the high frequency electricity consumption data from gridwatch.co.uk to
estimate the historical annual cycle and the historical peak/off-peak ratio. This
enabled us to construct the projections of peak and off-peak consumption with
the time step of 3 months. These are shown in Figure 2.
Distinction between peak and off-peak prices For realistic modeling of
electricity markets, it is essential to distinguish between peakload and baseload
(off-peak) prices. In particular, the effect of renewable penetration on these
two prices may be different. To this end, the simulations were carried out in
4
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/updated-energy-and-emissions-projections-2018, annex F
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Figure 2: Electricity demand projections used in the simulation.
a slightly modified version of the model, where peak and off-peak prices are
computed separately, by matching the corresponding demand projection with
the supply curve of the market, and the revenues of the agents are computed
by adding up their revenues over peak and off-peak periods. All the theoretical
developments carry over to this case, but we chose to present the single-price
case in the paper to lighten the notation.
Simulation results The first simulation illustrates the baseline case (with
the parameters and modeling choices described above). We perform 300 itera-
tions of the algorithm as described in Section 4, and monitor the gain increase
from switching to the best response for renewable and conventional producers
EC(ω(n), η(n)) and ER(ω(n), η(n)). Figure 3 shows the gain increase for the re-
newable and conventional producers in the baseline simulation: it can be seen
that this quantity converges to zero at the rate 1n where n is the number of
iterations. The final values for the baseline simulations correspond to a gain
increase of about 0.001 GBP per MW of installed capacity per hour for the con-
ventional producers and 0.005 GBP per MW of installed capacity per hour for
the renewable producers, which is quite small compared to the price at which
electricity is usually sold. Similar convergence rates and similar or smaller final
values have been observed in other simulations described below.
In the second simulation, which we term Scenario 1, we assume that there
is a 27% subsidy for renewable energy, bringing down the fixed cost of building
a wind power plant to 1000 GBP per kW of installed capacity. The other
parameters are same as above.
In the third simulation, termed Scenario 2, we assume that the conventional
producers receive a fixed payment of 10 GBP per KW of installed capacity
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Figure 3: Convergence of the gain increase upon switching to the best response.
The gain is given in million GBP for the entire sector.
per year. For comparison, the clearing prices at the UK T-4 capacity auctions
were 19.4 GBP/kW for 2018–2019, 18 GBP/kW for 2019–2020, 22.5 GBP/kW
for 2020–2021 and 8.4 GBP/kW for 2021-2022, see [26]. The 27% renewable
subsidy is still in place.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the conventional and renewable installed ca-
pacity in the three simulations. The corresponding price trajectories are shown
in Figure 5. While in the baseline scenario, no new renewable capacity is in-
stalled, the 27% renewable subsidy (scenario 1) dramatically increases renewable
installation, which practically doubles over the 15-year period. Notice that while
the conventional capacity is reduced in the beginning of the 15-year period, the
arrival of the renewable capacity is more gradual. This happens because of the
form of the demand process (Figure 2) which grows in the second half of the
15-year period.
In terms of electricity prices, the main effect of the renewable subsidy is a
reduction of the baseload price, especially during the winter months. On the
other hand, the peakload electricity price in winter months increases compared
to the baseline scenario. Thus, the renewable subsidy allows to decarbonize the
electricity production, but may lead to higher peakload prices. This happens in
our model because the conventional producers are strongly incentivised to leave
the market. In scenario 2 this incentive is reduced (in our case this is achieved
with capacity payments). As a result, the renewable penetration is slightly
reduced, but the peakload price is considerably lower than in scenario 1, and
also lower than in the baseline scenario. The baseload price, on the other hand,
is much lower than in the baseline scenario, slightly higher than in scenario 1 in
the summer months and similar to scenario 1 in the winter months.
We conclude that while renewable subsidies clearly lead to higher renewable
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Figure 4: Evolution of conventional and renewable installed capacity in the three
simulations. Scenario 1: renewable subsidy. Scenario 2: renewable subsidy and
capacity payments for conventional plants.
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Figure 5: Evolution of the electricity price in the three simulations. Top left:
peak price. Top right: peak price (zoom on the last 4 years). Bottom: base price.
Scenario 1: renewable subsidy. Scenario 2: renewable subsidy and capacity
payments for conventional plants.
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penetration, this may entail a cost to the consumer in terms of higher peak-
load prices. In order to avoid rising prices, the renewable subsidies must be
combined with market or off-market mechanisms ensuring that sufficient con-
ventional capacity remains in place to meet the energy demand during peak
periods.
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A Technical proofs
We provide here the complete proof of Lemma 2.
Part i. Step 1. Introduce the function
Lt =
(
Dt −
∫
Ω
x(η¯t(dx)− ηt(dx))
)
+
.
The price process satisfies
Pt(ωt, ηt) = inf{y ∈ [0, P ] :
∫
Ω
F (y − x)ωt(dx) + F0(y) ≥ Lt} ∧ P .
We would like to show that L has bounded variation on [0, T ]. To this end, let
ψ : [0, T ] 7→ R be a C1 function. We first show that for all t ∈ [0, T ],∣∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
t
ψ′(s)St,xs ds
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C‖ψ‖∞.
for some constant C <∞. Indeed, by using Itoˆ’s formula, we get:
E
[∫ T
t
ψ′(s)St,xs ds
]
= E [Ss,xT ψ(T )− Ss,xt ψ(t)]− E
[∫ T
t
ψ(s)k¯(θ¯ − St,xs )ds
]
.
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Then, by using that the process (Ss,xt ) takes values between 0 and 1, the result
easily follows. Now, we can consider the test function
u(t, x) = E
[∫ T
t
ψ′(s)St,xs ds
]
+ C‖ψ‖∞.
First note that, by construction, u ≥ 0. Moreover, it is easy to check through
explicit computation that u ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × Ω). Moreover, Ω is bounded and
consequently, ∂u∂t + Lu = ψ′(t)x is bounded on [0, T ] × Ω. Plugging this test
function into the definition of A(η0) yields∫ T
0
ψ′(s)
∫
Ω
xηt(dx) ≤ 2C‖ψ‖∞,
which means that the total variation of the mapping
t 7→
∫
Ω
xηt(dx),
is bounded on [0, T ] by 2C, and thus also Lt, has bounded variation on [0, T ].
Step 2. For a fixed n, define
Fnk (t) :=
∫ P
0
F (kP/n− x)ωt(dx) + F0(kP/n), k = 0, . . . , n.
We now would like to show that these functions have bounded variation on
[0, T ], uniformly on n, k, in the sense that for every n and every sequence of C1
functions ψk : [0, T ] 7→ R, k = 0, . . . , n,
n∑
k=0
∫ T
0
Fnk (t)ψ
′
k(t)dt ≤ C max
0≤t≤T
n∑
k=0
|ψk|, (11)
where the constant C does not depend on k, n. To this end, as above, we start
with the following estimate, obtained by Itoˆ formula and integration by parts,
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where to save space we omit the superscript (t, x) of the process C.
n∑
k=0
E
[∫ T
t
ψ′k(s)F (kP/n− Cs)ds
]
=
n∑
k=0
E
[ ∫ T
t
ψ′k(s)
{
F (kP/n− x)−
∫ s
t
F ′(kP/n− Cr)k(θ − Cr)dr
+
1
2
∫ s
t
F ′′(kP/n− Cr)δ2Crdr
}
ds
]
=
n∑
k=0
(ψk(T )− ψk(t))F (kP/n− x)
+
n∑
k=0
E
[ ∫ T
t
(ψk(T )− ψk(s))
{
− F ′(kP/n− Cs)k(θ − Cs) + 1
2
F ′′(kP/n− Cs)δ2Cs
}
ds
]
≤ C max
0≤t≤T
n∑
k=0
|ψk(t)| ,
because F (kP/n− x) and the terms in curly brackets in the last line above are
bounded by a constant independent from k, n and x in view of the properties
of F .
Now let us consider the test function
u(t, x) =
n∑
k=0
E
[∫ T
t
ψ′k(s)F (kP/n− C(t,x)s )ds
]
+ C max
0≤t≤T
n∑
k=0
|ψk(t)|.
It is easy to check that it possesses the required regularity properties, and sat-
isfies
∂u
∂t
(t, x) + Lu(t, x) =
n∑
k=0
ψ′k(t)F (kP/n− x).
Due to the boundedness property of the map F , we get that ∂u∂t + Lu is
bounded. Then, we plug it into the definition of A(ω0) and since
∫ P¯
0
F (kP/n−
x)ωt(dx) =
∫
Ω
F (kP/n− x)ωt(dx) for all t ∈ [0, T ], the result follows.
Step 3. Let ρ be a mollifier supported on [−1, 1], set ρm(x) := mρ(mx) and
define
Fn,mk (t) := ρm ∗ Fnk (t),
where Fnk is extended by zero value outside the interval [0, T ], so that F
n,m
k is
well defined on [0, T ]. Let ψ0, . . . , ψn be a sequence of test functions. Then, for
every m and for k = 0, . . . , n,
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n∑
k=0
∫ T
0
Fn,mk (t)ψ
′
k(t)dt =
n∑
k=0
∫ T
0
ψ′k(t)
∫ 1/m
−1/m
Fnk (t− s)ρm(s)ds dt
=
n∑
k=0
∫ 1/m
−1/m
ρm(s)ds
∫ T
0
ψ′k(t)F
n
k (t− s)dt
=
n∑
k=0
∫ 1/m
−1/m
ρm(s)ds
∫ T
0
ψ′k(t+ s)F
n
k (t)dt
≤ C max
0≤t≤T
n∑
k=0
|ψk(t)|
∫ 1/m
−1/m
ρm(s)ds = C max
0≤t≤T
n∑
k=0
|ψk(t)|,
where we extend ψk by constants outside the interval [0, T ]. The last inequality
follows by Step 2. By integration by parts, then,
n∑
k=0
∫ T
0
d
dt
Fn,mk (t)ψk(t)dt ≤ C max0≤t≤T
n∑
k=0
|ψk(t)|,
for a different constant C. Finally, by an approximation argument using the
dominated convergence, this implies that
∫ T
0
max
0≤k≤n
∣∣∣∣ ddtFn,mk (t)
∣∣∣∣ dt ≤ C.
Step 4. By definition of F0, F
n
k+1(t)− Fnk (t) ≥ cPn , 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. Now for
y ≥ 0 and 0 = x0 < x1 < · · · < xn, define the mapping Θn as follows.
Θn(y, x0, . . . , xn) =
P
n
n−1∑
k=0
(y − xk)+
xk+1 − xk ∧ 1.
Then,
∂Θn
∂y
=
P
n
n−1∑
k=0
1xk≤y<xk+1
xk+1 − xk ,
∂Θn
∂xj
=
P
n
1xj≤y<xj+1
(xj+1 − xj)2 (y − xj+1)−
P
n
1xj−1≤y<xj
(xj − xj−1)2 (y − xj−1).
Introduce the discretized price
Pnt (ωt, ηt) := Θn(Lt, F
n
0 (t), . . . , F
n
n (t)).
Let (Lmt )m≥1 be a sequence of C
∞ functions approximating Lt in the sense
of Theorem 3.9 in [3], and let Fn,m0 , . . . , F
n,m
n be defined as in Step 3. Let
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φ : [0, T ] 7→ R be a C1 function. Then,∫ T
0
φ′(t)Pnt (ωt, ηt)dt = lim
m→∞
∫ T
0
φ′(t)Θn(Lmt , F
n,m
0 (t), . . . , F
n,m
n (t))dt
≤ 2‖φ‖∞P + lim
m→∞
∫ T
0
φ(t)
∂Θn∂y ddtLmt +
n∑
j=0
∂Θn
∂xj
d
dt
Fn,mj (t)
 dt
≤ 2‖φ‖∞P + ‖φ‖∞‖∂Θn
∂y
‖∞ lim
m
∫ T
0
| d
dt
Lmt |dt
+ ‖φ‖∞ lim
m
∫ T
0
∑
k
|∂Θn
∂xk
|max
k
| d
dt
Fn,mk (t)|dt.
Since ∂Θn∂xk (t) 6= 0 for only two k, we deduce that |∂Θn∂xk (t)| ≤ 2c and therefore,∫ T
0
φ′(t)Pnt (ωt, ηt)dt ≤ 2‖φ‖∞P + ‖φ‖∞‖
∂Θn
∂y
‖∞ lim
m
∫ T
0
| d
dt
Lmt |dt (12)
+ ‖φ‖∞‖
∑
k
∂Θn
∂xk
‖∞ lim
m
∫ T
0
max
k
| d
dt
Fn,mk (t)|dt
≤ 2‖φ‖∞P + c‖φ‖∞ lim
m
∫ T
0
| d
dt
Lmt |dt
+ 2c‖φ‖∞lim
m
∫ T
0
max
k
| d
dt
Fn,mk (t)|dt ≤ C‖φ‖∞.
for some constant C, by the estimates provided in Step 3. This shows that
the total variation of Pn on [0, T ] is bounded uniformly on n. On the other
hand, by construction, it is easy to see that |Pnt −Pt| ≤ Pn , so that Pnt → Pt as
n→∞ for all t. Then, by passing to the limit in (12), we can conclude that Pt
has bounded variation on [0, T ].
Part ii. By the arguments of the first part of the proof, the mappings
t 7→
∫
Ω
xηmt (dx)
and, for every n and k = 0, . . . , n,
t 7→
∫
Ω
F (kP/n− x)ωmt (dx) + F0(kP/n)
have variation bounded uniformly on m. Therefore, one can find a subsequence
(mq)q≥1 along which these mappings converge to certain limits in L1([0, T ]).
Moreover, since Ω is bounded, in view of weak convergence of measures, for any
bounded continuous function φ : [0, T ] 7→ R,
lim
m
∫ T
0
φ(t)
∫
Ω
xηmt (dx) =
∫ T
0
φ(t)
∫
Ω
xη∗t (dx),
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which means that also∫
Ω
xη
mq· (dx)
L1([0,T ])−−−−−−→
∫
Ω
xη∗· (dx).
Similar arguments show that∫
Ω
F (kP/n− x)ωmq· (dx) L
1([0,T ])−−−−−−→
∫
Ω
F (kP/n− x)ω∗· (dx).
Since the mapping Θn introduced at Step 4 is Lipschitz, this implies that the
sequence of discretized prices Pn· (ω
mq
t , η
mq· ) also converges in L1([0, T ]) to the
discretized price Pn· (ω
∗
· , η
∗
· ). On the other hand, we have seen that |Pnt (ω∗t , η∗t )−
Pt(ω
∗
t , η
∗
t )| ≤ Pn . Therefore, for any ε > 0, by taking n ≥ 3PTε and then choosing
q such that
‖Pn· (ωmq· , ηmq· )− Pn· (ω∗· , η∗· )‖L1 ≤
ε
3
,
we have that
‖P·(ωmq· , ηmq· )− P·(ω∗· , η∗· )‖L1 ≤ ε,
which proves the second part of the lemma.
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